America's Bounty Diplomacy By: Daud Muhammad

 In the American frontier, emergent societies functioned barely within the law and citizens had to contend with all manner of brigands. In the absence of a standard police force, self-help was key to social order. Those who could not muster enough guns and men to secure their honour or recover stolen property offered rewards (bounties) and frequently hired professional 'thieftakers' to track and bring fugitives to justice 'dead or alive'. Ironically, the thieftakers were often themselves criminals yet at large ...

 Further details have emerged on the US$2,000,000 –ransom placed on Liberia's former (democratically elected) president Charles Taylor by the American government. The reward clause was allegedly 'smuggled' into a Bill for the funding of Mr. Bush's escapade in Iraq, and some Congressmen have even threatened to stop American aid to Nigeria until Taylor is handed over. The Bush administration is aware that Mr. Taylor's Nigerian exile is a cardinal article of the Liberian peace process. The Bush White House also understands that Nigeria and its regional allies facilitated the Liberian peace at huge cost in the face of the international community's dilly-dallying, and must be well-apprised of the dangerous effects the Taylor ransom will have on Liberia, Nigeria's security, and regional stability, if seriously pursued.

 So, why is the Bush administration so unconcemed to protect the hard-won Liberian peace? Is it merely a question of White House politicians not letting the principle of fidelity to a friendly country (Nigeria) stand against the expedience of their war in Iraq, or is there more to it?

 Several paradoxes compete in this latest twist. First, Mr. Taylor has only been indicted - neither tried, nor yet found guilty. In fact, lawyers representing him at the Sierra Leone war crimes tribunal are seeking to set aside the indictment. Second, the US does not recognize the UN's International Criminal. Court. Washington has in fact been sabotaging that court by concluding bilateral treaties with all manner of weak and dependant states to the effect that they would not recognize the court's jurisdiction with respect to Americans. Third, Mr. Taylor's extra-legal and brutal intervention in Sierra Leone was supposedly meant to protect what he perceived to be his country's (or his own) best interests.

 The US acted in Cuba, Granada, Nicaragua, Libya, and now Afghanistan and Iraq on the same bases that the Taylor acted - to protect self interests which apparently supersede international law and consensus. In these respects therefore, the thieftaker is an outlaw!

  The biggest paradox however concerns the rewards that America now offers for Nigeria's peacemaking in the region. Look at it this way: peace in Liberia is the peak achievement of a Nigeria being always keen to play the African 'big brother'. Having lost several millions and several hundred Nigerian lives to crises in Liberia since the 90s, Nigeria knows that the sub-region must be stabilized if Nigeria is not to be destabilized. Everybody believes that Mr. Taylor is the linchpin to Liberian and sub-regional crises; removing him from the theater of war by way of asylum in Nigeria offers Liberia (and the sub-region) the strongest 'hope yet for peace. For sure, Mr. Taylor must answer for his crimes at the opportune time. But for now, securing peace, helping millions of displaced Liberians find homes,' and providing a future for its traumatized children are the real issues. Washington's bounty seeks to force Nigeria to renege on its solemn commitments to Liberia; it thus undermines Nigeria's security, the Liberian peace process, and regional stability. How do we situate America's bounty diplomacy?

 It has been argued that the bounty is just one instance of several deliberate efforts aimed at securing for the US undisputed influence in the sub-region. To Washington, if Nigeria is allowed to deploy its massive oil wealth to solve the Liberian and other regional problems, it would secure leadership in the African region, and that would be a direct affront, a challenge to Washington's global leadership.

 But more fundamentally, Nigeria and its West African allies have proved that the international system stands to benefit more from a sincere regional effort than America's 'thieftaker' tactics. The Bush administration's ideology-driven foreign policy has failed and so has its trigger-happy doctrine of preemptive aggression,

 Liberia provides bold proof that sincerity of purpose - and action - can solve the Palestinian question (for instance), and that a sincere and constructive rapprochement on a regional tripod (with the UN and the EU as facilitators) could have worked in Iraq and Afghanistan. The success of regional efforts in Liberia undermines the central thrust of America's current foreign policy, and it is not in the Bush administration's interest to watch Nigeria succeed.

 On the domestic front, the bounty is not likely to engender peace, for Nigeria. Mr. Taylor is being hosted in Calabar, within range of the restive Niger Delta. Is the bounty meant to make Mr. Taylor fair game and a lucrative diversion for the militant youths who seem hell bent on preventing oil companies (many of them American) from making peaceful profits? Or is it meant to attract international mercenaries keen to collect the reward? What of the possibility of

 Taylor's Liberian rivals launching attacks on Nigerian soil to have Mr. Taylor's head on a US$2,000, 000 platter? The human and material costs (to Nigeria) of protecting Mr. Taylor would surely be more than US$2, 000,000

 Some of the foregoing analysis may be faulted, but the portents are obvious to the discerning. In simple terms, it is not in America's interest that Nigeria succeed in Liberia, and Nigeria should expect that its efforts will be continuously undermined from the American end. Is Nigeria prepared to fight on this front, too?